《人格同一2000001.ppt》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《人格同一2000001.ppt(46页珍藏版)》请在三一文库上搜索。
1、人格同一 (2),單元 24 哲學概論,1,授課教師:王榮麟,【本著作除另有註明外,採取創用CC姓名標示非商業性相同方式分享台灣3.0版授權釋出】,本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2003多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用,Accounts of Our Identity Through Time,(1) The psychological approach (2) The somatic approach,2,The Psychological Approach,Some psychological relation is nece
2、ssary or sufficient (or both) for one to persist. You are that future being that in some sense inherits its mental featuresbeliefs, memories, preferences, the capacity for rational thought, that sort of thingfrom you; and you are that past being whose mental features you have inherited in this way.,
3、3,The Psychological Approach,There is disagreement about what mental features need to be inherited. But most philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century have endorsed some version of the Psychological Approach. The Memory Criterion mentioned earlier is an example.,4,The So
4、matic Approach,Our identity through time consists in some brute physical relation. You are that past or future being that has your body, or that is the same biological organism as you are, or the like. Whether you survive or perish has nothing to do with psychological facts.,5,6,The Somatic Approach
5、,I am the same being as long as I have the same bodynot that the body must look the same as it did years ago, but that there is a body, which I was born with and which exists continuously as long as I live. There was not a moment during all that time in which this body did not exist. 不管我的外表、習慣、性情如何改
6、變,只要我與生俱來的身體持續存在,我還是原來的我。,A test case,Imagine that your brain is transplanted into my head. Two beings result: the person who ends up with your cerebrum and most of your mental features, and the empty-headed being left behind, which may perhaps be biologically alive but will have no mental features.
7、 Those who say that you would be the one who gets your brain usually say so because they believe that some relation involving psychology suffices for you to persist: they accept the Psychological Approach. Those who say that you would be the empty-headed vegetable say so because they take your ident
8、ity to consist in something entirely non-psychological, as the Somatic Approach has it.,7,心理派或身體派?,殺死情婦後的名醫還是原來的名醫嗎? 歷經學識英博之改變後的呂蒙還是昔日吳下阿蒙嗎? 失憶後的人還是原來的他嗎? 人格驟變後的人還是原來的他嗎? 植物人還是原來的他嗎? 你是當初在你媽媽子宮裡的那個受精卵嗎? 踏出傳輸機器後的人還是原來的他嗎? 借屍還魂後的Mr. Jordan還是原來的他嗎? 一早醒來身體遽變的人還是原來的他嗎? 被醫生救回來的人是辛先生或是申先生?,8,Support for th
9、e psychological approach: the brain-transplant case,Most people feel immediately drawn to the Psychological Approach. It seems obvious that you would go along with your brain if it were transplanted, and that this is so because that organ would carry with it your memories and other mental features.
10、This would lead the recipient to believe that he or she was you. And why should this belief be mistaken? This makes it easy to suppose that our identity over time has something to do with psychology.,9,Still, the question remains,It is notoriously difficult, however, to get from this conviction to a
11、 plausible answer to the Persistence Question: What psychological relation might our identity through time consist in?,10,The Memory Criterion,Lets consider the memory criterion: a past or future being might be you if and only if you can now remember an experience she had then, or vice versa.,11,Obj
12、ections to the memory criterion,This proposal faces two objections, discovered in the 18th century by Seargeant and Berkeley, but more famously discussed by Reid and Butler.,12,The first objection,First, suppose a young student is fined for overdue library books. Later, as a middle-aged lawyer, she
13、remembers paying the fine. Later still, in her dotage, she remembers her law career, but has entirely forgotten not only paying the fine but everything else she did in her youth. According to the Memory Criterion the young student is the middle-aged lawyer, the lawyer is the old woman, but the old w
14、oman is not the young student. This is an impossible result: if x and y are one and y and z are one, x and z cannot be two. Identity is transitive; memory continuity is not.,13,The second objection,你即為其經驗可被你記起的人,這種說法是trivial and uninformative。 理由如下: It seems to belong to the very idea of remembering
15、 that you can remember only your own experiences. To remember paying a fine (or the experience of paying) is to remember yourself paying. (我所記得的經驗就只能是我自己的經驗,我不可能回想起他人曾經歷過的經驗) That makes it trivial and uninformative to say that you are the person whose experiences you can rememberthat is, that memory
16、 continuity is sufficient for personal identity. It is uninformative because you cannot know whether someone genuinely remembers a past experience without already knowing whether he is the one who had it.,14,The second objection,Suppose we want to know whether 今先生, who exists now, is the same as 古先生
17、, whom we know to have existed at some time in the past. The Memory Criterion tells us that 今先生 is 古先生 if 今先生 can now remember an experience of 古先生 that occurred at that past time. But 今先生s seeming to remember one of 古先生s experiences from that time counts as genuine memory only if 今先生 actually is 古先
18、生. So we should already have to know whether 今先生 is 古先生 before we could apply the principle that is supposed to tell us whether she is.,15,A more challenging problem,The Memory Criteria face a more obvious problem: there are many times in my past that I cant remember at all. For instance, there is n
19、o time when I could recall anything that happened to me while I was dreamlessly sleeping last night. The Memory Criterion has the absurd implication that I have never existed at any time when I was completely unconscious. The man sleeping in my bed last night was someone else.,16,Causal dependency t
20、o the rescue,A solution appeals to causal dependence (Shoemaker 1984, 89ff.). We can define two notions, psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. A being is psychologically connected, at some future time, with me as I am now just if he is in the psychological states he is in then in
21、 large part because of the psychological states I am in now. Having a current memory of an earlier experience is one sort of psychological connectionthe experience causes the memory of itbut there are others.,17,Psychologically continuous,Importantly, ones current mental states can be caused in part
22、 by mental states one was in at times when one was unconscious. For example, most of my current beliefs are the same ones I had while I slept last night: those beliefs have caused themselves to continue existing. We can then define the second notion thus: I am now psychologically continuous with a p
23、ast or future being just if some of my current mental states relate to those he is in then by a chain of psychological connections.,18,Psychologically continuous,Now suppose that a person x who exists at one time is identical with something y existing at another time if and only if x is, at the one
24、time, psychologically continuous with y as it is at the other time. This avoids the most obvious objections to the Memory Criterion.,19,Fission: a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach,Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is
25、 that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. If your cerebrumthe upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental featureswere transplanted, the recipient would be psychologically continuous with you by anyones lights (even if there would also be import
26、ant psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you.,20,半腦切除術案例,有位小女孩患有慢性局部腦炎(Rasmussen Syndrome)。癲癇導致她右半身癱瘓,並且嚴重影響其語言技能。於是醫生在她三歲時施行了半腦切除術。當她七歲時,小女孩仍然能夠流利地說雙語(土耳其語和荷蘭語)。甚至半身癱瘓的狀況也已部份復原,只有左手和左腳有輕微痙攣現象。除此之外,她與正常人生活幾乎無異。,21,Fission: a more serious worry for the Psyc
27、hological Approach,If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomyeven the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speechis considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tu
28、mors: see Rigterink 1980.) What if we did both at once, destroying one hemisphere and transplanting the other? Then too, the one who got the transplanted hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach would be you.,22,But now suppose that both he
29、mispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. (We neednt pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) The two recipientscall them Lefty and Rightywill each be psychologically continuous with you. The Psychological Approach implies that any future being who is
30、 psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. But that cannot be: Lefty and Righty are two, and one thing cannot be numerically identical with two things. Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isnt. If you are Lefty, you are hun
31、gry at that time. If you are Righty, you arent. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: a contradiction.,23,Fission: a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach,Two solutions to the fission problem,Friends of the Psychological Approach have proposed two diffe
32、rent solutions to this problem: the “multiple-occupancy view” and the “non-branching view”.,24,The multiple-occupancy view,The multiple-occupancy view says that if there is fission in your future, then there are two of you, so to speak, even now. What we think of as you is really two people, who are
33、 now exactly similar and located in the same place, doing the same things and thinking the same thoughts. The surgeons merely separate them.,25,The multiple-occupancy view,The multiple-occupancy view is almost invariably combined with the general metaphysical claim that people and other persisting t
34、hings are made up of temporal parts. For each person, there is such a thing as her first half: an entity just like the person only briefer, like the first half of a race. On this account, the multiple-occupancy view is that Lefty and Righty coincide before the operation by sharing their pre-operativ
35、e temporal parts, and diverge later by having different temporal parts located afterwards.,26,The multiple-occupancy view,Lefty and Righty are like two roads that coincide for a stretch and then fork, sharing some of their spatial parts but not others. At the places where the roads overlap, they are
36、 just like one road. Likewise, the idea goes, at the times before the operation when Lefty and Righty share their temporal parts, they are just like one person. Even they themselves cant tell that they are two. Whether people really are made up of temporal parts, however, is disputed.,27,The non-bra
37、nching view,The other solution to the fission problem abandons the intuitive claim that psychological continuity by itself suffices for one to persist. It says, rather, that you are identical with a past or future being only if she is then psychologically continuous with you and no other being is.,2
38、8,This means that neither Lefty nor Righty is you. They both come into existence when your cerebrum is divided. If both your cerebral hemispheres are transplanted, you cease to existthough you would survive if only one were transplanted and the other destroyed.,29,A surprising consequence of the non
39、-branching view,The non-branching view has the surprising consequence that if your brain is divided, you will survive if only one half is preserved, but you will die if both halves are. Fission is death. That is just the opposite of what most of us expect: if your survival depends on the functioning
40、 of your brain (because that is what underlies psychological continuity), then the more of that organ we preserve, the greater ought to be your chance of surviving.,30,A surprising consequence of the non-branching view,In fact the non-branching view implies that you would perish if one of your hemis
41、pheres were transplanted and the other left in place: you can survive hemispherectomy only if the excised hemisphere is immediately destroyed. And if brain-state transfer is a case of psychological continuity, you would cease to exist if your total brain state were copied onto another brain without
42、erasing your own brain.,31,A surprising consequence of the non-branching view,Faced with the prospect of having one of your hemispheres transplanted, there would seem to be no reason to prefer that the other be destroyed. Most of us would rather have both preserved, even if they go into different he
43、ads. Yet on the non-branching view that is to prefer death over continued existence. 如果是進行手術的人是你,你會不會關心手術後那兩個人的前途、福禍與榮辱,如同你關心你自己未來的前途、福禍與榮辱一樣? 若是會,你為什麼會呢?既然那兩個人都已不再是你。 若是不會,這未免也太怪異了。,32,Parfits solution,Parfit, among others, tries to explain why we ought to prefer death over our own continued existe
44、nce: Insofar as we are rational, we dont want to continue existing. Or at least we dont want it for its own sake. What I really want is for there to be someone in the future who is psychologically continuous with me, whether or not he is me.,33,Parfits solution,The usual way to achieve this is to co
45、ntinue existing; but the fission story shows that I could have it without continuing to exist. Likewise, even the most selfish person has a reason to care about the welfare of the beings who would result from her undergoing fission, even if, as the non-branching view implies, neither would be her.,3
46、4,Personal identity question has no practical importance,In the fission case, the sorts of practical concerns you ordinarily have for yourself seem to apply to someone who isnt strictly you. This suggests more generally that facts about who is numerically identical with whom have no practical import
47、ance. All that matters practically is who is psychologically continuous with whom.,35,We may not persist by virtue of psychological continuity,This may cast doubt on the principal argument for the Psychological Approach. Suppose you would care about the welfare of your two fission offshoots in just
48、the way that you ordinarily care about your own welfare, even though neither offshoot would be you. Then you would care about what happened to the person who got your whole brain in the original transplant case, even if she would not be you.,36,We may not persist by virtue of psychological continuit
49、y,Even if you would regard that person as yourself for all practical purposesif you would anticipate her experiences just as you anticipate yours, for instancethat would in no way support the claim that she was you. So our reactions to the brain-transplant case may not support the view that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, but only the claim that psychological continuity is what matters practically, which is compatible with other accounts of our persistence. In that case we may wonder whether we have any reason to accept the Psychological A
链接地址:https://www.31doc.com/p-2586221.html