BMI China Defence and Security Report Q1 2012.pdf
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1、Q1 2012 defence is seen as having been linked to dangerously faulty infrastructure. ? Foreign companies continue to complain about the poor intellectual property. ? Chinese corporate governance is weak and non-transparent by Western standards. There is a considerable risk for foreign companies in c
2、hoosing the right local partner. Opportunities ? Chinas ongoing urbanisation and infrastructure drive will provide major opportunities for foreign investment in the landlocked provinces and the transfer of skills and know-how. ? The government is giving more protection and encouragement to the priva
3、te sector, which is now the most dynamic in the economy and accounts for most of the job growth. Threats ? Government will block attempts by foreign firms to take over nationally important assets. ? Rising labour costs, prompting some investors to turn to cheaper destinations. China Defence as well
4、as subsequent eurozone integration, which further deepened its export markets. Fiscal transfers to Greece (which has been an importer of German and other eurozone goods) are necessary to restore the balance following years of Germany reaping the rewards of monetary union at the expense of increasing
5、 indebtedness elsewhere. We would stress, however, that fiscal union is no panacea for the eurozones problems and comes with additional implementation risks. Fiscal union is commonly and flippantly cited as the solution to the sovereign debt crisis, but few consider what this entails. It would not o
6、ccur over night but could instead take years to design, ratify and implement the appropriate institutions and framework from which to organise fiscal transfers. Thus, even with a commitment to integration along these lines, the sovereign debt crisis could still reach critical mass before a formal fi
7、scal transfer system is inaugurated. It is also not certain whether the agreed framework would work. Centralisation of fiscal power would likely come with implementation difficulties, legal grey areas, and considerable nationalist opposition. Subordination of national fiscal policy to the eurozone w
8、ill not come easily. Greece As for Greece itself, we believe the coming decade will be one of the most testing both politically and economically since its transition away from military dictatorship in the mid-1970s. Beset by enormous structural economic challenges and crippled by a mountain of debt
9、that is nearly impossible to pay down, pushing through the reforms necessary to revive the economy will prove a herculean task. Such is the severity of the debt crisis, and its affect on Greek households, that the political system is likely to become more fractured, with much soul searching and cons
10、ideration of Greeces place within the eurozone and EU. There is also a risk that fringe political groups could gain a stronger footing. Discontent with the traditional political parties, allegations of endemic corruption and fears about a loss of sovereignty will give some of the smaller and more ex
11、treme political groups and parties plenty to capitalise on. While we would not necessarily suggest that such parties could form workable coalitions and take office, it would nonetheless fuel political tensions and societal divisions. Another risk is that the military could become more involved in ma
12、intaining public order. Libya Please note: Muammar Qadhafi was still alive at the time of writing. Although Colonel Muammar Qadhafis regime has been overthrown, pockets of resistance to the National Transition Council (NTC) interim administration remain. Even if the last pro-Qadhafi strongholds are
13、captured, we expect Libya to remain a highly unstable polity for years to come. Essentially, after 42 years of autocratic rule by Qadhafi China Defence those who favour a secular state and those who favour one with a more Islamist character; and numerous ethnic and tribal divisions. A failure to bui
14、ld a new state would run the risk of power vacuums, which could allow Islamist militants to establish a deeper presence in Libya, to the detriment of European security. Iran Irans nuclear programme has dropped off the international radar somewhat, but will remain a key source of global risk. Indeed,
15、 we believe that Western intervention against Libya has hardened Irans resolve to maintain its nuclear programme. Essentially, Qadhafi gave up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 in return for improved political and economic ties with Western nations. At the time, this seemed li
16、ke a mutually beneficial arrangement. However, the speed with which the West turned against Qadhafi in early 2011 and attacked Libya will serve as a sober warning to Tehran that the West cannot be trusted, and that Irans security ultimately lies with effective deterrence rather than political promis
17、es. Nonetheless, reports suggest that Irans nuclear programme has suffered from technical problems, especially at its new Bushehr nuclear plant, which were apparently caused by the Stuxnet computer virus (which is widely believed to be a form of cyber-warfare by Israel and/or the US). At the same ti
18、me, somewhat less alarmist Israeli assessments of the timetable for Iran developing a nuclear bomb suggest that US or Israeli military strikes on Iran are less likely in the near term. We retain our belief that the chances of a US or Israeli attack on Iran before the end of 2012 are still well below
19、 50%. The main risk to this assessment stems from whether the current unrest in MENA is perceived to enhance Tehrans geopolitical standing in the region. There is a possibility that Israeli policymakers will conclude that Turkeys increasingly confrontational stance towards their country and Egypts m
20、ore populist and pro-Palestinian position have gravely undermined the Jewish states security, and that in order to reassert their military supremacy in the region they would need to attack Iran. China Defence STPR = BMIs short-term political risk rating (out of 100, with 100 the best); tba/tbc = to
21、be announced/confirmed; na = not applicable, no clear party, or no house view; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA = Middle East and North Africa. Source: BMI, Reuters, Local media United States Stalemate To Persist Heading Into Election Season During 2012, the US political scene will increasingly be dom
22、inated by presidential and congressional elections to be held in November 2012. The poor economic outlook makes it increasingly unlikely that President Barack Obama will be elected to a second term in office. However, we maintain Obamas re- election as our core scenario until it becomes clear which
23、Republican Party candidate will oppose him. Meanwhile, we expect the Republican majority in the House of Representatives to continue to present obstacles to policy formation, as has proven the case throughout 2011 in several votes on fiscal policy. The major policy focus of Q411 is likely to be the
24、bipartisan congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which is due to issue a recommendation by November 23 2011 on reducing the federal budget deficit by US$1.5trn over the next decade. If the committee cannot agree on a set of recommendations, or Congress rejects the recommendation
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