BMI Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012.pdf
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1、Q1 2012 defence those who favour a secular state and those who favour one with a more Islamist character; and numerous ethnic and tribal divisions. A failure to build a new state would run the risk of power vacuums, which could allow Islamist militants to establish a deeper presence in Libya, to th
2、e detriment of European security. Iran Irans nuclear programme has dropped off the international radar somewhat, but will remain a key source of global risk. Indeed, we believe that Western intervention against Libya has hardened Irans resolve to maintain its nuclear programme. Essentially, Qadhafi
3、gave up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 in return for improved political and economic ties with Western nations. At the time, this seemed like a mutually beneficial arrangement. However, the speed with which the West turned against Qadhafi in early 2011 and attacked Libya wi
4、ll serve as a sober warning to Tehran that the West cannot be trusted, and that Irans security ultimately lies with effective deterrence rather than political promises. Nonetheless, reports suggest that Irans nuclear programme has suffered from technical problems, especially at its new Bushehr nucle
5、ar plant, which were apparently caused by the Stuxnet computer virus (which is widely believed to be a form of cyber-warfare by Israel and/or the US). At the same time, somewhat less alarmist Israeli assessments of the timetable for Iran developing a nuclear bomb suggest that US or Israeli military
6、strikes on Iran are less likely in the near term. We retain our belief that the chances of a US or Israeli attack on Iran before the end of 2012 are still well below 50%. The main risk to this assessment stems from whether the current unrest in MENA is perceived to enhance Tehrans geopolitical stand
7、ing in the region. There is a possibility that Israeli policymakers will conclude that Turkeys increasingly confrontational stance towards their country and Egypts more populist and pro-Palestinian position have gravely undermined the Jewish states security, and that in order to reassert their milit
8、ary supremacy in the region they would need to attack Iran. Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 15 An Israeli strike on Iran could in fact receive tacit support from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iran is widely suspected of fomenting Shia unrest in Bahrain,
9、 eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, although in some cases this is very difficult to prove. Even if Iranian support for the regions Shia is exaggerated, Tehran hopes to benefit from the weakening of traditional pro-US regimes in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere. On the domestic front
10、, Iran remains vulnerable to instability due to economic stresses, high inflation, a weakening currency and an ongoing power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and senior clerics loyal to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This suggests that the atmosphere in the run-up to the M
11、arch 2012 parliamentary elections will become increasingly acrimonious, and we may well see more officials removed from their posts as part of the political jockeying. Although Khamenei does not appear likely to remove Ahmadinejad from the presidency before the latters term ends in mid- 2013, he is
12、seeking to reduce Ahmadinejad to lame duck status, in the hope that a more pliable replacement will succeed him. Afghanistan The US is pressing ahead with withdrawing 33,000 surge troops from Afghanistan by mid-2012, starting with the departure of 10,000 soldiers by the end of 2011. The cuts are ste
13、eper than US generals favour, and suggest that Obamas policy is increasingly being determined by the need to please voters ahead of the November 2012 presidential election. Indeed, public support for rapid troop withdrawals is at a record high of 56%. We see a real risk that the accelerated troop cu
14、t could undermine gains made during the military surge from December 2009 to June 2010. In addition, with the US now clearly on the way out of Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgents could feel increasingly confident. This was evident by some bold raids on Western targets in Kabul in September 2011, and
15、 the assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani (who was still a key political player) on September 20. The Taliban could either step up their attacks, or alternatively lie low until most Western troops have departed, at which point the insurgents could resume their military campai
16、gn with fewer obstacles. Beyond the US election, the Western powers are aiming to hand full responsibility for Afghanistans security to the Kabul government at the end of 2014. However, we believe that this timetable is too optimistic, in light of the current stalemate between Afghan government forc
17、es and the Taliban, the absence of a political settlement between the two sides, and the difficulties experienced by Western military instructors in building up an effective Afghan National Army (ANA). We thus expect the US to negotiate a permanent military presence in Afghanistan, albeit on a much
18、smaller scale than the current 100,000-strong deployment. Reports in the international media in August 2011 suggested that the US might keep as many as 25,000 troops in Afghanistan until 2024. Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 16 The Korean Peninsula
19、For the same reasons as Iran, Western intervention in Libya will further reduce (if at all possible) the chances of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons. Despite this, and even after two major North Korean military provocations in 2010, inter-Korean tensions have calmed somewhat. Indeed, Hong
20、Joon- pyo, chairman of the Souths ruling Grand National Party, paid a rare visit the North on September 30 2011. Nonetheless, we do not expect a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations until 2013 at the earliest. This is because Pyongyang appears to be waiting for South Korean President Lee Myu
21、ng-bak to leave office in early 2013, and hopes that his successor will adopt a more conciliatory stance towards the North. Overall, we expect the Korean Peninsula to remain tense going into 2012, as North Korean leader Kim Jong Il prepares to transfer power to his son Kim Jong Un. This requires the
22、 support of the military and necessitates a hardline policy towards the South. We therefore continue to see the possibility of a new North Korean nuclear test in 2012, or a long-range missile test. A new naval confrontation in the West Sea is also a possibility. The key dates to watch are February 1
23、6 2012, when Kim Jong Il will mark his 70th birthday and, more prominently, April 15 2012, when North Korea will celebrate the centennial of the birth of its late founder, Kim Il Sung. The regime may well seek to drum up a martial or triumphant atmosphere at home through military provocations. The c
24、entennial is also likely to see a further elevation in the position of Kim Jong Un, who may formally be designated as his fathers successor. From our point of view, the biggest risk on the Korean Peninsula is miscalculation, as the North seeks to test the limits of the Souths tolerance for confronta
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