Heidegger and Marcuse - The Catastrophe and Redemption of History 海德格尔与马尔库塞 - 历史的灾难与赎罪.pdf
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1、 “This is a book of many virtues. It undertakes the conversation that the later Heidegger was too haughty and the mature Marcuse too disappointed to initiate. In light of this conversation, both Heidegger and Marcuse scholars will be provoked to take a deeper and more fruitful approach to these two
2、giants of twentieth century philosophy. More important still, the books brilliant readings of Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger, and Marcuse give new resonance to Feenbergs own work and open up new avenues for his extraordinarily circumspect and incisive social philosophy.” Albert Borgmann, University of
3、Montana “The Heidegger and Marcuse controversy over technology is an exciting story, not yet told, and Feenberg is clearly the one to do it.” Douglas Kellner, University of California at Los Angeles “It is well known that Marcuse was a student of Heidegger, and it is clear that the theme of technolo
4、gys deep transformation of our experience is quite prominent in both. But there has been little serious, detailed, philosophically informed treatment of this common issue in both thinkers. “Feenbergs book admirably fi lls that gap and more, illuminating each philoso- pher by comparison and contrast
5、with the other, and fi nally offering an extremely well-informed and original perspective on the issue. (Modern technological pessimism rarely admits the possibility of the redemption announced in the subtitle.) This is certainly the most philosophically ambitious and thoughtful treatment of Marcuse
6、 yet published, and is in its own right a sophisticated, compelling meditation on critical theory and our technological fate.” Robert Pippin, University of Chicago The Catastrophe and Redemption of History Andrew Feenberg Heidegger and Marcuse Routledge New York London Published in 2005 by Routledge
7、 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016 www.routledge- Published in Great Britain by Routledge 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN U.K. www.routledge.co.uk Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor on the other hand he developed a new interpretation of the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics of
8、 “real possibility” or “potentiality.” Marcuse xiiHeidegger and Marcuse did not quite follow these paths to the point of intersection but we can project a likely unifi cation of his thought at which he would no doubt have arrived had he remained under Heideggers infl uence for a few more years. Heid
9、eggers concept of authenticity continues a philosophical tradition that begins with Rousseau and Kant. In their thought the essence of the human being is freedom. This marks a break with substantive notions of human nature such as Aristotles that defi ne the human in terms of defi nite qualities and
10、 virtues. Human nature, insofar as there is such a thing for a philosophy of freedom, consists of formal properties of the subject rather than a repertoire of attributes. But the logic of freedom in Rousseau and Kant is bound to a notion of rationality that ends up determining the telos of human dev
11、elopment much as had earlier substantive theories of human nature. For existentialistsand despite his denial Heidegger is a kind of existentialist freedom is illusory unless it escapes every rationalistic conception of its end. This Heidegger accomplishes by defi ning human “Dasein” as a self-questi
12、oning and self- making being “thrown” into a world without rhyme or reason and destined to discover its own meanings there. But inauthentic existence, average everyday existence, consists in conformism and refusal of self-responsibility. The insight into freedom represented by Heideggers philosophy
13、is too hard a lesson to be commonly lived. To be fully humanauthenticis to acknowledge the groundlessness of human existence and nevertheless to act resolutely. By resoluteness Heidegger does not mean arbitrary deci- sions but rather “precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is
14、factically possible at the time,” that is, the response called for by the situation (Heidegger 1962, 345). In resoluteness the human being intervenes actively in shaping its world and defi ning itself, as opposed to inauthentic conformism. Unfortunately, Heideggers philosophy offers no means for det
15、ermining criteria of what is “factically possible” and so leaves the question of action in the air. Marcuse took over this theory unreservedly in his early writings, but he rejected Heideggers abstract formulations. What is this “situation” in which the human being is “thrown,” and what are these “p
16、ossibilities” so vaguely invoked by Heidegger in Being and Time? The emptiness of such categories invites revision. Heidegger himself fi lled in the blanks with Nazi ideology for a time, although one wonders how he made the leap from the heights of philosophical abstraction to the lower depths of na
17、tion- alism and racism. Marcuse turned in the opposite direction toward Marxism. The self is thrown into a capitalist society where the alienation of production is the source of the inauthenticity that must be overcome. Now authenticity becomes the “radical act” of revolutionary refusal of the exist
18、ing society. In Heidegger making and self-making are intimately connected in the concept of being-in-the-world developed in the fi rst chapters of Being and Time. Daseins answer to the question of its being is bound up with the technical practices through which it gives meaning to and acts in its wo
19、rld. But, strangely, production drops out when Heidegger explains authenticity in the second division of his master work. This ambi- guity disappears as Heidegger develops his later critique of technology. Technical practice ends up unmaking worlds and the reference to self-making, and with it the w
20、hole problematic of authenticity, simply disappears from Heideggers discourse. Prefacexiii Marcuse resolves the ambiguity differently. He fi rst introduces the Marxist idea of revolution in a two-sided formulation that encompasses the transformation of both individual and society. As he describes it
21、, the central concern of “the Marxist funda- mental situation . is with the historical possibility of the radical actof an act that should liberate a new and necessary reality as it brings about the actualization of the whole person” (Marcuse 1987c, 350).3Marcuse soon turns to the Hegelian idea of l
22、abor as an objectifi cation of the human spirit to join Heideggers phenomenological analysis of production with his abstract conception of human self-making. Labor is an engagement with possibilities actualized through struggle with nature, possibilities which belong to the human being as well as th
23、e object. The “possibility” required by the “situation” is thus neither the determined outcome of objective processes as orthodox Marxists supposed, nor an ineffable intuition with dubious results as in Heidegger himself, but a free appropriation of the human essence in a socially concrete form thro
24、ugh the liberation of labor. Marcuse never articulated the relation between his theories of authenticity and possibility quite as clearly as this. The radical act and the dialectical interpretation of history are the two sides of an arch awaiting the keystone to join them. I will argue in this book
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