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1、Russian Theory of International RelationsAndrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A. TsygankovSan Francisco State University, Moscow State UniversityIn International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert A. Denemark. Vol. X, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2010, pp. 6375-6387.IntroductionRussian society
2、 has changed dramatically since the Soviet disintegration, and the emergence of new theories of international relations heralded this change. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and its officially sanctioned “Marxist” social science, Russian scholars have been making intellectual headway in ad
3、justing to new realities. Analyzing the emerging Russian IR studies helps us answer some of the key questions about Russia. How does the new Russia see itself in the world? How does it perceive the new international environment? Which social and political institutions does it see as appropriate to d
4、evelop after the end of the Cold War? These are the questions that are at the heart of the new Russian IR scholarship, and these are the questions that continue to drive Western scholarship about the new Russia.The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition in international studies has d
5、rawn scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in certain social conditions and may reflect cultural premises. Historically the tradition is rooted in work by Karl Mannheim (1936) and Max Weber, among others. (For contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations of knowl
6、edge, see Hoffmann 1977; Weaver 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2001.)In particular, it has become more common to view international relations as a branch of research that often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, civilization (Hoffmann 1977; Craw
7、ford and Jarvis 2001). Recently scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand IR from the perspective of various peripheries Asian (Callahan 2004a; Acharya and Buzan 2007), East European (Guzzini 2007), Latin American (Tickner 2003), and Russian (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007; Tsygankov
8、 2008) suggesting the emergence of a new subdiscipline of comparative IR theory (Callahan 2004b).In addition, some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of IR theory in the West, such as realism, liberalism, and critical theory or constructivism (Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Weber 2005Pag
9、e: 1Not in refs. Please supply details.; Nau 2006), are shaped by theorists ideological preferences. As they each emphasize concepts of balance of power, international institutions, and human exploitation/emancipation in their research, these theories reflect broader ideological concerns about Self/
10、Other relationships. Realists, for example, tend to perceive the rise of alternative communities or Other as threatening and recommend that Self prepare to defend its security. On the other hand, many Western liberals, while recognizing the increasingly globalized character of world politics, mainta
11、in an image of a progressive assertion of Selfs values and overlook the forces of identity and diversity associated with the Other. Some critical theorists too have a tendency to oversimplify the Self/Other relationships (Shani 2008).In this essay we argue that Russian theory of international relati
12、ons is nationally specific, yet it is also grounded in three main intellectual traditions of presenting Self, Other, and their relationships. We refer to these traditions as Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism because they each emphasize categories of the West, the independent state, and the di
13、stinct civilization as their desired identifications of the Russian Self. Although the Russian intellectual traditions have recovered their strengths after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the history of Russias relations with Europe and the nineteenth century debates about the “R
14、ussian idea.” We therefore adopt a broad definition of IR theory, viewing it as a systematically developed image of the world that is grounded in a local cultural history, rather than in evolution of the Western social science.The essay is organized as follows. We first review the nature of Russian
15、historical intellectual debates and the impact of the Soviet legacy on discussions of international relations in Russia. We then discuss some post-Soviet discussions within the field, focusing on theories of international system, regional order, and foreign policy. Although Russian IR cannot be full
16、y reduced to these areas of research, they remain the most developed. (For other overviews of the Russian discipline of international studies, see Sergounin 2000; Bogaturov et al. 2002; Shakleyina 2002; Lebedeva 2003; 2004; Torkunov 2004; A. Tsygankov and P. Tsygankov 2004; 2006; Kokoshin and Bogatu
17、rov 2005.)We conclude by reflecting on future directions of Russian international studies and the dialectic of global and local in development of IR theory.Three Intellectual Traditions in RussiaAcross different historical eras, Russia has developed three traditions or schools of thinking about Self
18、 and Other Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationist. Throughout centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists sought to present Russias international choices in ways consistent with their historically established images of the country and the outside world. This section relies on discussio
19、ns in Tsygankov (2006), Neumann (1996), Prizel (1998), Ringmar (2002), and Hopf (2002).Westernizers saw the Russian idea as an essentially Western idea, and they placed the emphasis on Russias similarity with Western nations and viewed the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the
20、world. The early Westernizers sought to present Russia as a loyal member in the family of European monarchies. Alexander I, for instance, championed the so-called legitimist policies and established the “Holy Alliance” with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary activities on the con
21、tinent. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Westernizers, such as Alexander II, identified with the West of constitutional freedoms and political equality. Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing too far apart from European social-democratic ideas. For instance, on
22、e of Gorbachevs favorite lines of thinking was that the Soviet Union had to “purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). Finally, the post-Soviet liberal Westernizers argued the “natural” affinity of their country with th
23、e West based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. Sharing the prejudices of many in the West, liberal Westernizers, like Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin, were fearful of the Other and warned against relations with former Soviet allies. They insisted that only by buil
24、ding Western liberal institutions and integrating with the coalition of what was frequently referred to as the community of “Western civilized nations” would Russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its economic and political backwardness.Statists have equated the Russian idea with that
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