【演讲稿】英语演讲稿:The Great Silent Majority.docx
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1、第 1 页 英语演讲稿:The Great Silent Majority1 特征码 FeFETngQygHXqawVnfqg Good Evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division abo
2、ut Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefor
3、e, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration? 第 2 页 What has really happened in the negoti
4、ations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had be
5、en killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a prehensive peace proposal
6、. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friend, as well as our enemies, abroad. In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After
7、 all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him - and e out as the peacemaker. Some 第 3 页 put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnsons war to bee Nixons war. But I had a g
8、reater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether
9、some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnsons war bees Nixons war. The great question is: How can we win Americas peace? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States bee involved in Vietnam in the
10、 first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist 第 4 页 government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, P
11、resident Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts of prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as bat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American bat force
12、s to South Vietnam. Now many believe that President Johnsons decision to send American bat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is - now that we are in the war, what is th
13、e best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow
14、the Communists to repeat the 第 5 页 massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more th an 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city o
15、f Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would bee the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the m
16、illion-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North. For the United States this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world. 第 6 页 Three American Pre
17、sidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly
18、in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So were going to stay there. President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of o
19、ffice. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great pow
20、ers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our mitments help maintain the 第 7 页 peace - in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring mor
21、e war. For these reasons I rejecte d the remendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.
22、 In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the plete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. We ha
23、ve offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and 第 8 页 conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a tak
24、e-it-or- leave-it basis. We have indicated that were willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodg
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